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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(e) , whereby the defendant in a district court criminal 
action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final 
judgment and conviction of any crime other than first degree or 
capital felony. 
TEXT OF STATUTES 
AMENDMENT XIV, SECTION 1, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No state shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, §76-6-402(1)(1953 AS AMENDED) 
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses. The following presumption 
shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory 
explanation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie 
evidence that the person in possession stole the property. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, §76-6-408 (1953 AS AMENDED) 
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property—Duties of pawnbrokers. (1) 
A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the 
property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing 
that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds 
or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any such property 
from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, with a purpose to 
deprive the owner thereof. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for paragraph (1) is 
presumed in the case of an actor who: 
(a) Is found in possession or control of other property stolen on 
a separate occasion; or 
(b) Has received other stolen property within the year preceding 
the receiving offense charged; or 
(c) Being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or 
disposed, acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far 
below its reasonable value. 
(d) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business 
dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal 
property, and every agent, employee or representative of the 
pawnbroker or person who buys, receives or obtains property shall 
require the seller or person delivering the property to certify, in 
writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the property. If the 
value given for the property, exceeds $20 the pawnbroker or person 
shall also require the seller or person delivering the property to 
obtain a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the bottom of 
the certificate next to his signature or any other positive form of 
identification. 
(i) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business 
dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or 
personal property, and every agent, employee or 
representative of the pawnbroker or person who fails to 
comply with the requirements of (d) shall be presumed to 
have bought, received or obtained the property knowing it 
to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. This 
presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(ii) When in a prosecution under this section it appears from 
the evidence that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a 
person who has or operates a business dealing in or 
collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal 
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a 
pawnbroker or person, that the defendant bought, received, 
concealed or withheld the property without requiring the 
person from whom he bought, received, or obtained the 
property to sign the certificate required in paragraph (d) 
and in the event the transaction involves an amount 
exceeding $20 also place his legible print, preferably the 
right thumb, on the certificate, then the burden shall be 
upon the defendant to show that the property bought, 
received or obtained was not stolen. 
(3) As used in this section: 
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or 
lending on the security of the property; 
(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling 
goods. 
vii. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. In light of the instructions and evidence as a whole, 
did Instruction No. 21 constitute reversible error because it 
incorrectly stated the law and violated both federal and state due 
process requirements? 
2. Was the evidence presented, all of which was 
circumstantial, insufficient to support the conviction either 
because it failed to pass the reasonable alternative hypothesis test 
or because it was so inconclusive that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt of Ms. Martinez's guilt? 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction against Nancy 
Wardle Martinez for Theft by Receiving, a felony in the third 
degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1953 as amended). 
The appellant was charged with Theft by Receiving, a second degree 
felony, (See Addendum A), and was found guilty by a jury of the 
lesser included offense of Theft by Receiving, a third degree 
felony, on May 22, 1987, in the Third Judicial District Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard H. 
Moffat, Judge, presiding. The Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, 
sentenced Ms. Martinez on May 22, 1987, to a term of zero to five 
years at the Utah State Prison, which sentence was stayed and 
appellant placed on probation for eighteen months. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Officer Scott Bell, a deputy sheriff witjh Salt Lake 
County, conducted two interviews with Ms. Martinez during which she 
related to him the following events (R. 223, 229-230). On the night 
of September 28, 1986, Nancy Martinez and her son went to a party at 
Storm Mountain (R. 224). Ms. Martinez drove her car to the party 
(R. 224). At the party, Ms. Martinez met a man named Michael Smith 
(R. 225). Officer Bell testified that Ms. Martinez never told him 
specifically how much she drank that night, but his impression was 
that she had had a "couple of beers" (R. 226). However, in his 
police report, Bell wrote that she told him she had consumed exactly 
four beers at the party (R. 234). 
After drinking the alcohol, Ms. Martinez began to feel 
sick and dizzy (R. 225). The next thing Ms. Martinez remembered was 
in her car as it was driven down the mountain by the man she met 
named Michael Smith (R. 225-226). Ms. Martinez then went back to 
sleep (R. 226). She next remembered waking up when a police 
officer, Deputy Walker, knocked on the window of her vehicle (R. 
226) . 
At approximately 9:00 p.m. of September 28, 1986, Deputy 
Bruce Walker was driving westbound on 3900 South approaching the 
intersection at 9th East (R. 188-189). He noticed a car driven by a 
man with dark hair (R. 189-191). Officer Walker could see the man's 
mouth moving, but could not see the face, eyes or mouth of the woman 
(R. 191, 210). Because he saw the man's mouth moving, the officer 
believed the pair was talking (R. 191). According to Officer 
Walker, when the man noticed the police car next to him, he 
"snapped" his head and looked at the officer with surprise (R. 191). 
After passing through the intersection, the car pulled 
behind some businesses in an area where vehicles did not usually go 
(R. 193-195). The officer made a U-turn, and followed the car 
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(R. 195). Finding the car parked, he approached the vehicle and saw 
the female passenger with her head leaned back (R. 196-197). 
Officer Walker testified that the passenger, Ms. Martinez, looked 
asleep (R. 211). There was a child, Ms. Martinez's son, asleep on 
her lap (R. 198-199). The officer did not see the man who had been 
driving the vehicle (R. 197-198). 
Officer Walker tapped his flashlight on the driver's side 
door, and Ms. Martinez "stirred" (R. 198). This was the first time 
the officer could see her eyes (R. 210). Officer Walker smelled 
alcohol from the vehicle and later decided that Ms. Martinez had 
been using alcohol (R. 210-211). When asked where the driver was, 
Ms. Martinez told the officer the driver was Mike Smith, and she 
"didn't know why but that he got out of the car and said he would be 
back in a minute" (R. 199). She also told the officer that she did 
not know exactly where she was (R. 202). 
Officer Walker saw a television and a blue bag with a 
camera and flash attachment in the back of the vehicle (R. 200). 
There were no blankets or other articles covering the items (R. 
202). Officer Walker asked Ms. Martinez whose car it was, and she 
responded that it was her car (R. 202). She produced a registration 
for the car, but it was registered in the name of Christy A. Moore 
(R. 202). 
Officer Walker impounded the car and inventoried the 
contents of the vehicle (R. 203). In addition to the television, 
camera bag, camera and flash attachment, the officer found a VCR and 
two windbreakers (R. 200-201). When asked whose property was in the 
back of the car, Ms. Martinez said she had no idea (R. 202). She 
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never claimed the property in any way (R.2 15). She stated that she 
did not know where it came from or how it got in the car (R. 215). 
All property was seized from the back of the car (R. 216-217). 
Officer Walker believed the items were stolen (R. 204). 
After investigating, the officer learned that the items Mr. Daily 
was missing matched the items he found (R. 205). Mr. Daily later 
identified the items as those which were removed from his residence 
(R. 173). 
Of the two windbreakers which were found, the tan one 
belonged to Mr. Daily and the black one belonged to Ms. Martinez (R. 
108-109). A watch belonging to Mr. Daily was found in the pocket of 
the black jacket (R. 106-107). The jacket appeared a little bit 
large for Ms. Martinez (T. 109). Ms. Martinez had worn the jacket 
at Storm Mountain; however, she later took the jacket off, wrapped 
it around her son, and put on another coat (T. 109). Ms. Martinez 
was not wearing the jacket when Officer Walker approached her 
(T. 80). 
Mr. Daily claimed that when he returned home on the 
evening of September 28, 1986, he noticed two different sizes of 
footprints in his rug (T. 53). He stated he was able to notice 
these footprints because he had vacuumed his house before he left 
and made no footprints on the rug himself (T. 53). Mr. Daily had no 
expertise in footprinting, but tried to point out the footprints to 
a police officer whose name he did not remember (T. 61, 62). Mr. 
Daily did not mention the footprints to the initial officer or to 
anyone else (T. 62). The officer he did mention them to did not 
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take any pictures of the alleged footprints nor did Mr. Daily (T. 
61-62). 
Defense counsel took exception to Instruction No. 21 
(R. 314) which stated: 
Possession of recently stolen property, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a 
circumstance from which you may reasonable (sic) 
draw the inference and find, in the light of the 
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence of 
the case, that the person in possession knew the 
property had been stolen. 
(See Addendum B.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error in giving 
Instruction No. 21 to the jury. The instruction did not correctly 
state the law, but was an impermissible meshing of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-402(1) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408(2)(1953 
as amended). The instruction violated both federal and state due 
process requirements by relieving the State of its burden to prove 
each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of 
the lack of both curing explanatory instructions and sufficiently 
corroborating circumstances, the error was not harmless, but 
prejudicial, requiring reversal. 
The evidence presented, all of which was circumstantial, 
was insufficient to support the conviction. Ms. Martinez offered a 
reasonable explanation of her innocence which the State not only did 
not disprove but supported. The conviction was based almost 
entirely on inference and speculation. Viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the jury verdict, it was sufficiently 
inconclusive so that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt of Ms. Martinez's guilt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN SUBMITTING INSTRUCTION NO, 21 TO THE JURY, 
Nancy Martinez was convicted of theft by receiving, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, §76-6-408 (1953 
as amended). In its charge to the jury, the trial court included 
the following instruction: 
Possession of recently stolen property, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a 
circumstance from which you may reasonable (sic) 
draw the inference and find, in the light of the 
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence of 
the case, that the person in possession knew the 
property had been stolen. 
(Instruction No. 21 - See Addendum B). Defense counsel initially 
objected and later took exception to this instruction arguing that 
it included an improper inference (T. 56-57). 
"Inferences and presumptions are common factfinding 
devices whereby one fact is used to determine the existence of 
another fact." State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 325 (Utah 1985). 
The Utah Legislature specified three separate situations which would 
allow for a presumption of the requisite knowledge for a conviction 
of theft by receiving in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408(2) (1953 as 
amended). Those presumptions are summarized as: 
(a) possession or control of other property stolen 
on a separate occasion; or 
(b) receipt of other stolen property within the 
year preceding the receiving offense charged; 
or, 
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received 
having acquired it for consideration which he 
knows is far below its reasonable value. 
The Utah Legislature also explicity created a presumption of prima 
facie guilt of theft in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(1) (1953 as 
amended): (1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall be deemed 
prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole the 
property. 
The standard for assessing the constitutionality of 
presumptions used in jury instruction is "whether the challenged 
jury instruction had the effect of relieving the State of the burden 
enunciated in [rn Re] Winship [397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 
L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). . ." Chambers at 325, quoting Sandstrom v. 
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2458, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 
(1979). That burden of proof is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
every element necessary to constitute the crime charged. In Re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). This 
burden is required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, as well as 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Winship, 397 U.S. at 
364, 90 S.Ct. at 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d at 375; Chambers at 325. 
In reviewing the constitutionality of a jury instruction, 
"the potentially offending words must be viewed in the context of 
the charge as a whole." Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315, 105 
S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344, 354 (1985). The Utah Supreme Court 
explained that "it is elementary that we read the language of an 
instruction in light of its immediate context of the instructions as 
a whole." State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Utah 1986). 
A. INSTRUCTION NO. 21 DOES NOT CORRECTLY STATE 
THE LAW. 
The crime of theft by receiving requires that the person 
have knowledge that the property is stolen or a belief that it 
probably has been stolen. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1)(1953 as 
amended). A presumption of this required knowledge is allowed in 
three specific circumstances as detailed in the statute. Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-408(2)(1953 as amended). Those three circumstances are 
summarized as: 
(a) possession or control of other property stolen 
on a separate occasion; or 
(b) receipt of other stolen property within the year 
preceding the receiving offense charged; or, 
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received 
having acquired it for consideration which he 
knows is far below its reasonable value. 
None of the circumstances contains any broad language which would 
allow for a presumption of knowledge based on conditions not 
specified by the Legislature. 
Instruction No. 21, as provided for the jury in the 
instant case, allows the jury to infer the requisite knowledge from 
"possession of recently stolen property." This basis for finding 
knowledge is not one of the bases permitted by the statute. Even 
the broadest interpretation of the statutory bases could not be 
stretched to include the basis of Instruction No. 21. The Utah 
Legislature could easily have included "possession of recently 
stolen property" as a permissible basis for finding knowledge that 
the property had been stolen if it had so desired. 
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Having elected to not allow this basis, the trial court in the 
instant case erred in so doing. 
Instruction No. 21 is modeled after the presumption 
allowed under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(1)(1953 as amended). That 
section provides: 
Possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, 
shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person 
in possession stole the property. 
However, the "inference" contained in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(1) 
(1953 as amended) seems to require a "conscious" possession of the 
property in order to trigger the "inference". See State v. Smith, 
726 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah 1986) footnote 1. 
Instruction No. 21 impermissibly meshes and juggles the 
language of the two statutes, in effect bootstrapping §76-6-402(1) 
on to §76-6-408(2). The instruction limits the application of the 
former and enlarges the application of the latter, instruction No. 
21 is, therefore, a misstatement of the law and allowed the jury to 
draw an inference which the legislature did not choose to allow. 
B. INSTRUCTION NO. 21 VIOLATED FEDERAL DUE 
PROCESS REQUIREMENTS. 
As noted above, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits the State from employing jury instructions that 
relieve the State of the burden of proof of each element of the 
crime charged. The determination of "whether a defendant has been 
accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a 
reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction." Sandstrom 
v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2456, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 
45 (1979). This analysis "must focus initially on the specific 
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language challenged." Francis v. Franklin/ 471 U.S. 307, 315, 105 
S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344, 354 (1985). The instruction must then 
be viewed in the context of all the jury instructions because 
another instruction "might explain the particular infirm language to 
the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the 
charge to have created an unconstitutional presumption." Id., 472 
U.S., at 315, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344, 354 (1985). 
Instructions that "relate to the issue of guilt and 
relieve the State of its burden of proof" violate due process. 
State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987). Particularly, "a 
jury instruction using the language of U.C.A. 1953, §76-6-402(1) is 
unconstitutional because it directly relates to the issue of guilt 
and relieves the State of its burden of proof." State v. Chambers, 
709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985). The Chambers Court stated unequivocally: 
"Thus, the statutory language should not be used in any form in 
instructing juries in criminal cases, and we expressly disavow the 
language and holdings of our earlier cases to the contrary." 
Chambers at 327; Turner at 1045 (Emphasis added). 
Instruction No. 21 in the instant case used the language 
of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(1) (1953 as amended) "in any form". The 
instruction used the same basis for suggesting an inference of the 
crucial element of knowledge as the theft statute did for a 
presumption of guilt. However, theft by receiving requires the 
three elements of possession, knowledge and intent. After inferring 
knowledge from assumed possession, the final element of intent is 
easily inferred based on instruction No. 13, (R. 72) (See 
Addendum C) thereby establishing guilt. 
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In State v. Smith, the challenged instruction 
incorporated the language from the theft statute. Reading the 
language of the instruction "in light of its immediate context and 
the context of the instructions as a whole", the Smith Court found 
that although the statutory language should not have been used, the 
jury could not "have reasonably applied the instructions in an 
unconstitutional manner." Smith at 1234-1235. 
In the challenged Smith instruction, the trial court 
carefully added that if "from the evidence and beyond a reasonable 
doubt" you find that certain facts including possession existed, 
"then you may infer from those facts that the defendant committed 
the theft." Smith at 1234. A later instruction in that case 
explained: "The mere fact that a person was in conscious possession 
of recently stolen property is not sufficient to justify a 
conviction of theft. There must be proof of other circumstances 
tending of themselves to establish guilt." Smith at 1235 n.l. 
Instruction No. 21 did not include an explanation that 
the jurors must find that Ms. Martinez had possession before making 
any inferences. Instead, the instruction seems to assume that Ms. 
Martinez had possession. Language similar to that in Smith, such as 
"only if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Martinez was in 
possession of stolen property can you make an inference from those 
facts" would have informed the jury that they must first determine 
whether Ms. Martinez had possession of the stolen property. 
The instruction, after assuming possession, further 
informed the jury that the ordinary and reasonable inference to be 
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drawn based on such possession was that Ms. Martinez had knowledge 
that the items were stolen, unless she could satisfactory explain 
the possession. 
From this language, a reasonable juror could have 
interpreted the instruction as requiring an assumption of the 
element of possession as well as strongly suggesting that the 
"ordinary" and "reasonable" next step was an inference of the 
element of knowledge. The phrase "if not satisfactory explained", 
like the phrase "'may be rebutted1 could have indicated to a 
reasonable juror that the defendant bore an affirmative burden of 
persuasion once the State proved the underlying act giving rise to 
the presumption." Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S., at 318, 105 S.Ct. 
1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344, 356 (1985). 
Instruction No. 21 also did not contain any language 
informing the jury that the mere fact that a person was in 
possession of recently stolen property was not sufficient to sustain 
a conviction, or that corroborating circumstances are required to 
sustain a conviction. Language requiring corroborating evidence 
would have been critical in the present case since, unlike Smith, 
there was no corroborating evidence to support Ms. Martinez's 
conviction. 
In Smith the evidence showed acts, falsehoods and 
declarations sufficient "to support the permissive inference of 
guilt." Smith at 1235. Ms. Martinez never claimed possession of 
the property or knowledge of where it came from (R. 215). She did 
not try to hide the property (R. 202). She did not try to offer an 
explanation which later proved false by the evidence. She did not, 
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unlike the defendant in Smith, do or say anything incriminating. 
The inference of guilt or of knowledge that the property was stolen 
was not sufficiently supported by corroborating evidence. 
While the instruction does contain a permissive, rather 
than mandatory inference, as reflected in the use of the word "may", 
such a distinction is meaningless when the instruction is read as a 
whole since the assumption of possession and the indication that an 
inference would be reasonable seem to mandate that such an inference 
be drawn. Furthermore, similar permissive language was found to not 
eliminate the instructional error in State v. Walton, 646 P.2d 689 
(Utah 1982). "Since [the jury] was given the option of employing 
the presumption, we have no way of being assured that the defendant 
was not convicted on the basis of that presumption." Walton at 692. 
While the charge to the jury in the instant case did 
include general instructions regarding the state's burden of 
persuasion and the defendant's presumption of innocence (R. 62, 65, 
84), such instructions "do not dissipate the error in the challenged 
portion of the instructions." Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 320, 
85 L.Ed.2d at 357. 
In the present case there were two general instructions 
«uxv,h attempted to remove any opinion or comment on the evidence by 
the court, including the direction: "If an instruction applies only 
to a state of facts which you find does not exist, you will 
disregard the instruction." (R. 71, 89). If this attempted 
explanation had immediately followed Instruction No. 21 in more 
direct language such as, "If you find that the element of possession 
does not exist, you may not make the inference of knowledge," 
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perhaps the constitutional infirmity of No. 21 could have been 
corrected. However, as the instruction existed, the jury could have 
interpreted and applied Instruction No. 21 in an unconstitutional 
manner. 
Based on the language of the challenged instruction and 
its relationship to the instructions as a whole, the jury in the 
present case could have found the instruction a conclusive 
presumption of the element of possession or knowledge or both. The 
jury could also have found the instruction to shift the burden of 
persuasion to Ms. Martinez on the element of possession or knowledge 
or both. lf[B]ecause either interpretation would have deprived [Ms. 
Martinez] of [her] right to the due process of law", the giving of 
the instruction was constitutional error. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 
U.S. 510, 525, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 51 (1979). 
The constitutional infirmity of Instruction No. 21 was 
not cured by sufficiently corroborating evidence, nor was it cured 
by explanatory language within the same or other instructions. 
Instruction No. 21, therefore, violated due process because it 
related to the issue of guilt and relieved the State of its burden 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime 
charged. Furthermore, it used the language of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-402(1) (1953 as amended), which was expressly prohibited in 
Chambers. 
C. INSTRUCTION NO. 21 VIOLATED STATE DUE PROCESS 
REQUIREMENTS. 
Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law. 
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The language is similar to that of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
therefore the argument set forth above is applicable to the Utah due 
process provision. Furthermore/ the State of Utah is free to 
provide greater protections under its due process clause than those 
provided by the federal constitution. See generally "Recent 
Developments in Utah Law", 1987 Ut. L. Rev. 79; See also State v. 
Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986). 
While the distinction, if any, between the protections 
offered by the Utah due process clause and the federal due process 
clause in the context of this case has not yet been decided, in at 
least one instance the Utah Supreme Court has based a decision on 
the state protection rather than relying on the federal clause. 
In State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), this Court 
held that the due process clause in the Utah Constitution prohibits 
the refiling of criminal charges absent a showing of new or 
additional evidence or other good cause. This Court noted that as 
the federal law on this point was unsettled, it was better to 
address the issue under the state constitution. 
In the present case where the instruction misstated the 
law and raised an impermissible inference, assuming that Ms. 
Martinez possessed the property and informing the jury that a 
reasonable inference to be drawn from that possession was knowledge 
that the property was stolen, the instruction violated Ms. Martinez1 
right to due process under the Utah State Constitution. The other 
instructions did not cure this infirmity and the lack of 
corroborating evidence compounded the constitutional error. 
D. INSTRUCTION NO. 21 WAS PREJUDICIAL, REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
The Utah Supreme Court found the instructional error not 
reversible in State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1236 (Utah 1986). 
Although the statutory language used in Smith was error, the Court 
held that "the instruction cannot be deemed reversible error in this 
case in light of the clear explanatory instructions that all the 
jury could make of the term "prima facie" was a permissible 
inference." Smith at 1236. As discussed above [See Point 1(B)], 
the careful explanations present in Smith were not present in the 
instant case. Lacking the protection of the explanations, 
Instruction No. 21 may have been interpreted unconstitutionally, 
thereby creating reversible error. 
In State v. Turner, this Court found reversible error 
even though defense counsel "failed to challenge the defective 
instructions". 736 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Utah App. 1987). "The 
prejudicial effect of the presumptions created by the jury 
instructions is especially clear in light of the slim evidentiary 
basis for [defendant's] convictions." Turner at 1046. As discussed 
in detail below (See Point II), the-evidence offered to prove the 
crime of theft by receiving was based on the fact that Ms. Martinez 
was found asleep with a sleeping baby in her arms in the passenger 
seat of the vehicle where the property was found (R. 211, 198-199). 
Even the trial judge had difficulty finding possession based on the 
facts (R. 253-254). The State did not produce any evidence that Ms. 
Martinez knew the property was stolen or that she intended to 
deprive the owner of the property. With such limited evidence to 
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support Ms. Martinez's conviction, "we cannot say with any 
confidence, on the whole record, that the constitutional errors in 
this case were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Rose v. 
Clark, U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)." 
Turner at 1046. 
In light of the violation of the State and federal 
constitutions, Ms. Martinez respectfully requests that the 
conviction be reversed and the matter be remanded for a new trial 
free of such constitutional error. 
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
THE CONVICTION OF THEFT BY RECEIVING. 
At the close of the state's case in chief defense counsel 
moved for dismissal based on the state's failure to present a prima 
facia case (R. 239). After considerable discussion, the motion was 
denied (R. 239-257, 261). Defense counsel renewed this motion both 
at the close of evidence and before sentencing (R. 276, 115). After 
admitting "I think the question is a close one", the trial judge 
denied the motion (R. 283). 
The power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting a guilty verdict is well established. For the 
Court to reverse a conviction the Appellant must show that: 
The evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). Furthermore, the 
evidence must be viewed "in the light most favorable to the verdict 
of the jury." Petree at 444. The Utah Supreme Court stated that in 
reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, the Court will "not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury, the unique function of 
which is to evaluate the evidence and assess the credibility of the 
witnesses." State v. Speer, 718 P.2d 383, 385 (Utah 1986). 
However, "notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's 
decision this court still has the right to review the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the verdict." Petree at 444. 
The standard of review in cases involving only 
circumstantial evidence is more severe. "Where the only evidence 
presented against the defendant is circumstantial, the evidence 
supporting a conviction must preclude every reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence." State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976). The Hill Court explained the 
basis for this strict standard: "This is because the existence of a 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence necessarily raises a reasonable 
doubt as to the defendant's guilt." Hill at 222. 
As defined by the Utah Legislature and the Utah Supreme 
Court: 
In order to obtain a conviction for theft by 
receiving, the State must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt each of the following elements: (1) the 
defendant received, retained, or disposed of the 
property of another, (2) knowing that the property 
had been stolen or believing that it probably had 
been stolen, (3) with the purpose to deprive the 
owner thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1) (1953 as amended); Hill at 223. The 
statute defines "receives" as "acquiring possession, control, or 
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title or lending on the security of the property." Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-408(3) (1953 as amended). In the instant case, the state 
attempted to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 
the existence of the three required elements solely by 
circumstantial evidence. While it is true that "circumstantial 
evidence alone may be competent to establish the guilt of the 
accused/1 State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1982), such 
evidence will only be competent if it passes the higher standard 
required in Utah by the Hill decision. 
A. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CONVICTION IN THIS 
CASE DOES NOT PASS THE HILL TEST. 
In Hill, the Court found the evidence sufficient to prove 
the first element of theft by receiving. The defendants did receive 
the stolen goods. Hill at 223. However, the Court also found that 
the defendants offered an explanation which, "if true, would negate 
the required second element of knowledge, as well as the third 
element, specific intent." Hill at 223. The explanation was 
established through testimony from police officers showing that 
defendants had explained that the merchandise was purchased in good 
faith, that what was thought to be a valid bill of sale was 
obtained, and that the defendants lacked any knowledge or belief 
that the merchandise was stolen. Hill at 223. Once the defendants 
offered this explanation, "The State, therefore, had the burden of 
disproving this explanation beyond a reasonable doubt." Hill at 223. 
It is not, therefore, the defendant's burden to prove his 
explanation of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. Any explanation 
of innocence which would, if true, negate an element of the crime, 
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requires that the state disprove such explanation beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This burden is not one of merely suggesting a 
conflicting theory and allowing the jury to decide which explanation 
it finds more persuasive. The state carries the heaviest burden in 
relation to the offered explanation. If the state does not disprove 
the explanation beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury may not 
convict. If the jury does convict, the reviewing court must reverse 
the conviction. 
The conviction in the instant case requires reversal 
since Ms. Martinez offered an explanation of her innocence which, if 
true, would negate both the second and third required elements of 
the crime of theft by receiving. Mirroring the evidence offered in 
Hill, Officer Bell testified that Ms. Martinez explained that she 
had been asleep in the car from the time of driving down the 
mountain until Officer Walker awakened her (R. 226). Officer Walker 
testified that when he approached the vehicle Ms. Martinez looked 
asleep with a child in her lap (R. 211, 198-199). Ms. Martinez 
never claimed the property found in the vehicle in any way. 
(R. 215). She stated that she did not know where it came from or 
how it got in her car (R. 215). 
The testimony of Officers Bell and Walker showing that 
Ms. Martinez had been drinking alcohol that night tends to support 
the hypothesis that she was asleep during the time in question (R. 
226, 234, 210-211). The evidence incriminating the driver, Michael 
Smith, also supported the explanation of innocence. 
The State had the burden of disproving this explanation 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The State attempted to meet its burden 
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through Officer Walker's unsupported assessment, "I felt that she 
was pretending to be asleep." (R. 211). Officer Walker offered no 
explanation as to why he felt she was pretending. On the contrary, 
his testimony only supported her explanation. The State also relied 
on the fact that the watch was found in Ms. Martinez's jacket pocket 
(R. 227-228). Even if that evidence alone established possession, 
it did not establish knowledge or specific intent sufficient to 
disprove the explanation of innocence offered by Ms. Martinez. 
Lastly, and least persuasively, Mr. Daily testified that he noticed 
two difference sizes of footprints in his rug, one big and one small 
(R. 174). Whatever this suggests, it does not prove or disprove 
whether Ms. Martinez had the required knowledge or intent. 
The State, therefore, did not meets its burden of 
disproving Ms. Martinez's reasonable explanation of innocence beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Without the required disproof, the "hypothesis 
of innocence necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt." Hill at 222. The evidence supporting the 
conviction of Ms. Martinez in this case, taken as a whole, does not 
meet the standard required by Hill. Ms. Martinez respectfully asks 
this Court to follow the Hill precedent and reverse her conviction. 
B. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CONVICTION IN THIS 
CASE DOES NOT PASS THE PETREE TEST. 
This Court should be confident in reversing the 
conviction in this case based solely on Hill since the language in 
Hill requires the application of the "reasonable alternative 
hypothesis" test. The often quoted standard of review defined in 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983), does not include this 
"reasonable alternative hypothesis" provision. The Petree standard 
is controlling on the review of evidence supporting a conviction 
where the evidence is not solely circumstantial. Although all of 
the evidence presented in the instant case was circumstantial, 
discussion of the Petree standard of review is offered in this brief 
for the purpose of strengthening the argument. 
The evidence offered in support of Ms. Martinez's 
conviction is sufficiently inconclusive so "that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime" of theft by receiving. Petree at 444. The 
prosecution made its most persuasive case in attempting to prove the 
existence of "receiving" or "acquiring possession or control", the 
first element of the crime. Although the strongest, the evidence 
offered to prove the first element is not strong enough to pass the 
Petree test, in the unlikely event that this Court would find the 
first element sufficiently proven, the evidence cannot meet the 
standard for the second element of knowledge or the third element of 
specific intent. 
The prosecution relied on a theory of constructive 
possession to establish the first element. The Utah Supreme Court 
has held that constructive possession exists where the property is 
"subject to (defendant's) dominion and control." State v. Fox, 709 
P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985); State v. Carlson, 635 P,2d 72, 74 (Utah 
1981). The Court further explained, "Ownership and/or occupancy of 
the premises upon which the (property is) found, although important 
factors, are not alone sufficient to establish constructive 
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possession, especially when occupancy is not exclusive." Fox at 
319, citing United States v. Davis, 562 F.2d 681, 693 (D.C. Cir. 
1977). Evidence offered by the prosecution to show constructive 
possession "must raise a reasonable inference that the defendant was 
engaged in a criminal enterprise and not simply a bystander." Fox 
at 320. 
In an attempt to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. 
Martinez "acquired possession or control" over the admittedly stolen 
property, the state offered the following evidence: Ms. Martinez 
claimed ownership of the vehicle in which the property was found 
(R. 202). Ms. Martinez was present in the vehicle when the property 
was found (R. 197) and the watch was found in a jacket belonging to 
Ms. Martinez that she had worn earlier in the evening (R. 227-230). 
This evidence taken as a whole is sufficiently inconclusive. 
Ms. Martinez's claimed ownership of the vehicle is 
insufficient to establish constructive possession. The car was 
legally registered to Christy A. Moore (R. 202). Notably, the 
vehicle was impounded because Ms. Martinez had no legally recognized 
right to possession or control over the vehicle (R. 202-203). Even 
the trial judge, when addressing the prosecutor, alluded to the 
inconclusive nature of the claimed ownership, "The car is not 
registered to the name of the person who is sitting in it even 
though they say, yes, it's my car" (R. 253). 
Ms. Martinez's occupancy of the vehicle is equally 
insufficient to establish constructive possession. Her occupancy 
was not exclusive until the driver fled the parked car just prior to 
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Officer Walker's arrival. As a passenger in the vehicle, Ms. 
Martinez did not have "dominion and control" over the vehicle. The 
trial judge recognized the insufficiency of the occupancy argument 
when he inquired of the prosecutor: 
What do you do about the fact, Mr. Jones, that in this 
case a minute and a half or two minutes earlier there had 
been a different driver of this vehicle? The car is now 
parked. That driver has disappeared. . . And (Ms. 
Martinez) disclaimfs] any knowledge of how it came to be 
in the car and any knowledge or any ownership of it or 
anything of the sort. -Maybe—maybe you have an argument 
that the driver of the car might be possessing because 
he's in control of the vehicle. What do you do about a 
passenger? 
(R. 253-254). Ms. Martinez was a bystander, a sleeping bystander, 
with no dominion or control over the vehicle whatsoever. 
The presence of the watch in Ms. Martinez's jacket is 
equally insufficient to establish her dominion or control over the 
watch. Ms. Martinez had worn the jacket earlier at a party at Storm 
Mountain, then taken it off to wrap around her son, and put on 
another coat (R. 230). Ms. Martinez was not wearing the jacket when 
Officer Walker approached her (R. 201). The jacket, present in the 
vehicle, was as much under the control of the driver as it was Ms. 
Martinez. Any special control she had over the jacket ended when 
she took it off. 
In the unlikely event that this Court finds the evidence 
of constructive possession sufficient to meet the Petree test, the 
State must still meet the standard for the second and third 
elements. No direct evidence was offered to prove the second 
element of knowledge or reason to believe that the property was 
stolen. The state argued that when someone is found in possession 
- 24 -
of the stolen property, it may be inferred that the person knew or 
had reason to believe the property to be stolen (R. 252-253). 
Reliance on this inference is, therefore, completely contingent upon 
the establishment of the first element of possession. 
The prosecution finds support for the inference of 
knowledge or reason to believe in the size of the items (R. 279). 
The prosecutor argued that because the items "took up the entire 
back seat of a small sub compact car", (R. 279), it is a natural 
inference that Ms. Martinez would know or believe them to be 
stolen. The size of the items would support an inference that Ms. 
Martinez knew of the presence of the items in the car. Knowledge of 
the existence of the items does not, however, establish constructive 
possession or justify the inference of knowledge or reason to 
believe the property stolen. 
The Petree Court illuminated the extent and limitation of 
the power to review inferences: 
In fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence 
and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, 
the reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary 
fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean 
that the court can take a speculative leap across a 
remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. 
Petree at 445. Any conclusion that Ms. Martinez knew or had reason 
to believe the articles found in the back of the car were stolen 
based upon her presence asleep in the passenger seat of the car is 
just such an impermissible speculative leap. It is possible the 
evidentiary fabric would have stretched to cover the inference of 
knowledge if Ms. Martinez had been alone, awake and driving, or said 
anything incriminating. In the absence of any such evidence 
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suggesting possession and knowledge, the jury was allowed to convict 
Ms. Martinez by inferring from an inference, a process dangerously 
close to a presumption of guilt. 
Lastly, there is absolutely no evidence supporting a 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the third element, purpose to 
deprive the owner of his property. Absent any evidence which 
addressed the issue directly, the State apparently believed that yet 
another inference, this time of specific intent, was permissible. 
Even if the evidence proved that Ms. Martinez received Mr. Daily's 
property, it was insufficient to prove that she did so with the 
purpose of depriving Mr. Daily thereof. Stretched "to its utmost 
limits", the evidentiary fabric of this case does not cover the 
inference of this specific intent. Petree at 445. 
The evidence supporting the conviction in this case is so 
sufficiently inconclusive that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that Ms. Martinez committed the crime 
for which she was convicted. The fabric of evidence does not cover 
the gap between the presumption of innocence and the proof of 
guilt. Only pure speculation can sustain the jury's verdict. The 
evidence does not, therefore, pass the Petree standard for 
sufficiency. Ms. Martinez respectfully asks this Court to reverse 
her conviction in compliance with Petree. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellant, Nancy Wardle 
Martinez, requests that this Court reverse her conviction of Theft 
by Receiving and remand her case to the trial court for a new trial 
or dismissal of the charges. 
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ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO SJ 
Possession of recently stolen property, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which 
you may reasonable draw the inference and find, in the light of 
the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence of the case, 
that the person in possession knew the property had been stolen. 
ADDENDUM C 
:NSTRUCTION NO, / ^ 
Under the laws of the State of Utah, the intent with 
which an act is done denotes a state of mind and connotes purpose 
in so acting. Intent, being a state of mind, is not always 
susceptible of proof by direct and positive evidence and must 
ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statements or 
circumstances. 
